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NOTE
DIVERSIONS OF NEVADA'S TRUCKEE RIVER
FORESHADOW DOOM FOR ENDANGERED
SPECIES*
INTRODUCTION
The reservation of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians surrounds
Pyramid Lake in Nevada. For over 70 years upstream diversion from the
Truckee River reduced the amount of water that reached the lake. This
in turn imperiled the lake's indigenous fish. In 1973, the federal government initiated action on behalf of the Tribe to obtain additional river flows
for the lake. However, the Supreme Court held that the water rights
involved were adjudicated in another suit, concluded almost forty years
before; thus res judicata barred reappraisal.'
Then in 1986, the Paiute Tribe asserted a new cause of action. It charged
that the Navy's act of diverting water, which otherwise would flow into
Pyramid Lake, violated provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 2
In March of 1990, the Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of the Tribe's ESA
claims in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Departmentof theNavy.3 In so doing, the court discounted federal regulations
and substantial case law and passed up a crucial opportunity to clarify
important issues and terms in the ESA.
This note discusses the Tribe's claim that the Navy harmed an endangered fish in Pyramid Lake and thus violated the prohibition against
"taking" an endangered species in section 9 of the ESA. The court
purported to evaluate whether the diversions effected a taking since they
harmed the fish and adversely modified its habitat. Since, however, the
Tribe was unable to prove that the Navy alone actually caused degradation
of the species' habitat, the court never reached the issue of harm.
*This note is one section of the thesis that received the 1991 Award for the Best Natural Resource
Thesis, awarded by the Natural Resource Section of the State Bar of New Mexico.
1. Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2909 (1983).

2. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531-44 (1988)).
Enactment of the ESA is illustrative of a "shift in property rights from the private individual to
the public community.... [ltj establishes endangered species as common resource property much
as we have come to treat our architectural heritage and historical monuments. Essentially the approach
says that no one has the right to obliterate a species any more than any one has the right to build
highrise apartments on the site of Independence Hall, the Alamo, or the Statue of Liberty and that
this should hold whether the land be held privately or publicly.'" Coggins & Russell, Beyond Shooting
Snail Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 Geo. L.J. 1433,
1459-60 (1982).
3. 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
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A logical expansion of the court's holding is that, in cases where
multiple entities degrade a single habitat, it can never be proved that any
single degrader is an actual causer; every contributor is exempt from
responsibility. Consequently, destruction of the habitat remains unchecked, further imperiling endangered species and creating the antithesis
of Congress' intent in passing the ESA: conservation of endangered species and their habitats. Instead of absolving multiple habitat degraders,
preservation of endangered species requires adoption of an equitable policy to allocate responsibility among contributors.
The opinion also rendered the definition of harm in section 9 of the
ESA ineffectual and left unsettled whether harm would be restrictively
or expansively construed by the Ninth Circuit. So, Tribe v. Navy left the
interpretation of section 9 problematic. The opinion, as a result, not only
denied relief to the endangered species in this case, but also created
confusion regarding interpretation of section 9 for future ESA claims.
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, through its opinion in Tribe v. Navy, held
the power to clarify key terms and major issues crucial to effective application of section 9. Yet, the court relinquished a pivotal opportunity
to continue to delineate the contours of the ESA.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Conflict arose between the Tribe and the Navy because of the Navy's
diversion of water from the Truckee River for a Nevada naval air station."
The Navy operates Fallon Naval Air Station, where it conducts flight
training.' The desert conditions of Nevada create unique dangers to aircraft." So, to diminish the risk of these dangers, the Navy surrounded its
4. Both the Tribe and the Navy have adjudicated water rights to the Truckee River. The land held
by the Navy for use as buffer zones is part of the Newlands Reclamation Project (established by the
Bureau of Reclamation in 1903). The Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation,
controls and limits diversions from the Truckee and Carson Rivers for use in the Newlands Project.
These limits are in the Bureau's Operating Criteria and Procedures ("OCAP") for the Newlands
Project, which are subject to preexisting water rights on the Truckee and Carson Rivers. See Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975);
Truckee-Carson hr. Dist. v. Dept. of Int., 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 472 U.S.
1007 (1985).
The Newlands Project is administered by the Truckee Carson Irrigation District (TCID), under a
contract with the Secretary of the Interior. TCID must operate the project consistent with the
Secretary's OCAP. Owners of land for which project water is allocated, including the Navy, pay
fees to the TCID for use of the water allocated them. Under the OCAP, the TCID must divert
sufficient water to assure availability of the total amount of water allocated to various users. Brief
for Appellee at 6-7, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d
1410 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
5. As a result, the station is the location of aircraft which repeatedly take off and land. The remote
desert location provides the Navy with training capabilities not available at any other naval facility.
Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d at 1412.
6. The main dangers include poor visibility caused by dust storms, damage to aircraft engines
from foreign objects, and an increased risk of fire. Id.
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runways with "buffer zones." The Navy leased the land to farmers who
grew irrigated crops in the buffer zones beginning in the 1950s. Since
then, the Navy has diverted water from the Truckee River to irrigate this
out-lease land.
Absent diversions, the Truckee empties exclusively into Pyramid Lake

on the Tribe's reservation. The cui-ui, an endangered species of fish, is
found only in Pyramid Lake. 7 Historically, the river's flow kept the lake's
level constant and provided river spawning opportunities for the cui-ui.
Between 1920 and 1940, diversions of Truckee River water caused the
level of Pyramid Lake to drop forty feet and the surface area to shrink
by about twenty thousand acres. The lowered level of the lake limited
the cui-ui's ability to reach its spawning grounds in the Truckee River.8
In 1984, the Navy announced plans to expand its out-lease program
which required additional diversions of Truckee River water.9 The Tribe
challenged this proposed expansion and argued that the Navy's diversion
of Truckee water violated the ESA because it jeopardized the continued
existence of the cui-ui. In an ultimately unsuccessful effort to avoid
litigation, the parties entered a memorandum of understanding: the Tribe
held back its lawsuit and in return the Navy delayed long-term expansion
and entered year-to-yearleases only.' When efforts to negotiate a binding
resolution failed, the Tribe filed this lawsuit.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE TRIBE'S
SECTION 9 CLAIM
The Tribe's Claim
According to the Tribe, the Navy violated section 9 of the ESA which
makes it unlawful for any person to "take" endangered species." The
7. In 1967, the cui-ui (pronounced "kwee-wee") (Chamistes cujus), the only pure species remaining in the genus Chasmistes, was declared endangered. 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (1967). Id. at 1413,
See 50 C.F.R. § 17.1 1(h) (1990). The Lahontan cutthroat, also found in Pyramid Lake, was originally
listed as endangered, but was later upgraded to a threatened species. 40 Fed. Reg. 29863 (1975).
Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 4. See 50 C.FR. § 17.1 1(h) (1990).
8. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F.Supp. 704, 707 (1982), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. -Clark, 741 F,2d 257 (Nev. 1984).
9. The Navy planned to expand the program by leasing an additional 734 acres, the remainder
of its project land, and to increase lease terms from five to ten years. Brief for Appellee, supra note
4, at 8, Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
10. The Navy was awaiting the results of an independent consultant's report as to alternative
means of achieving the goals of the out-leasing program that would require less water than the
proposed plan. Id. at 9.
11. Section 9 of the ESA provides that it is "...
unlawful for any person... to... take any
(endangered] species." 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(l)(B) (1988). "'[Plerson' means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity, or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the federal government, of any state or political subdivision thereof,
or of any foreign government." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988).
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ESA defines "taking" as actions that "harni" listed species.' 2 The regulations implementing the ESA define "harm" as:
an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.
Thus, modification of an endangered species' habitat, in a way that significantly impairs its reproduction, amounts to an unlawful taking.
The Tribe contended that the Navy's existing agricultural leases diverted 15,000 acre-feet of Truckee water annually. These diversions took
away water that the cui-ui needed for spawning, an activity essential for
4 According to the Tribe, the diversions harmed
survival of the species. ,
the cui-ui and adversely modified its habitat, and thus constituted an
unlawful taking of an endangered species.
The Navy's Defense
The Navy responded that the diversions did not constitute harm as
defined in section 9 through three arguments. First, the Navy pointed out
that it initiated formal consultation for its year-to-year leases (1985, 1986,
and 1987), in accordance with Federal regulations, and obtained nonjeopardy biological opinions from the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). "
Since the opinions concluded that the leases did not threaten the cui-ui,
the Navy asserted that its diversions evaded the section 9 definition of
harm.

16

to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
12. "Take" includes ...
collect." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
13. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1990).
14. Brief for Appellant at 32-34, Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Brief
for Appellant].
15. 50 C.F.R. section 402 interprets and implements sections 7 (a)-(d) of the ESA. These regulations grant authority to and impose requirements upon Federal agencies regarding endangered or
threatened species. For instance, when a Federal agency contemplates action ("all activities... by
Federal agencies" 50 C.F.R. §402.02 (1990)) which is likely to affect an endangered species, it
must enter into formal consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries
Service. 50 C.F.R. §§402.01(b), 402.14(a) (1990)).
16. Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 27.
The Tribe unsuccessfully rebutted this assertion by claiming that the opinions were incompetent.
The Tribe proved that the FWS's investigation for the opinions neglected to assess the indirect effects
of the Navy's out-lease program. For authority, the Tribe cited C.F.R. section 402.14 which required
the FWS to evaluate the "effects" of the federal agency's action when formulating its opinion. 50
C.F.R. §402.14(g)(3) (1990).
"Effects" is defined as direct and indirect effects of an agency's action on a species "or critical
habitat, together with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that
action, that will be added to the environmental baseline. The environmental baseline includes the
past and Oresent impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions... in the action area, the anticipated
impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area ... and the impact of State or private
actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in process .... Interrelated actions are
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Second, the Navy argued that the Tribe unjustifiably stretched section
9 so that any use of Truckee water constituted significant habitat modification or degradation and hence was a taking.' 7 Based on Pallav. Hawaii
Department of Land & NaturalResources (PalilaII), s the Navy claimed
that only "habitat degradation that might result in extinction of an en-

dangered species" constituted harm.

9

Since the FWS's opinions con-

cluded that the Navy's leases would not jeopardize the cui-ui, the leases
would not lead to the extinction of the cui-ui and, by definition, would
not harm the species.'
Finally, the Navy claimed that the Tribe produced no evidence that any
one year's diversion by the Navy, in and of itself, precipitated the inability
to spawn. Instead, the Navy said documentation showed only that total
diversions from the Truckee harmed the cui-ui. 2' Since the Tribe failed
to prove that the Navy's diversions alone provoked catastrophic modification of the cui-ui's habitat, the Navy contended that its diversions did
not harm the cui-ui. 2
The Court's Holding
The Ninth Circuit stated that [i]n Palila [II]k this court ruled that habitat
degradation that could resultin extinction constitutes 'harm' under section
9."23 However, the court degreed that the Navy's diversions were not a
taking since the evidence failed to establish "that any one year's diversion
those that are part of a larger action." 50 C.F.R. §402.02 (1990) (emphasis added). "Indirect
effects are those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still are reasonably
certain to occur." Id.
The Tribe showed that the non-jeopardy biological opinions issued by the FWS were based only
on direct effects from the Navy's out-lease program. The opinions solely analyzed effects of Truckee
diversions on cui-ui spawning runs that occurred during the one year in which each lease was in
effect. So, indirect effects, caused by the proposed action but later in time, could not have been
evaluated in the FWS's inquiry. Brief for Appellant, supra note 14, at 7.
17. Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 27.
18. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Hawaii 1986), aft'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
19. Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 26-28 (emphasis added).
20. The Tribe countered that Palila II offered no support for this proposition because the Palila
9 court expressly declined to decide whether a more inclusive definition of harm could be applied:
degradation which retards recovery of a species. The possibility thus remained that the Ninth Circuit
might endorse an expansive construction of harm that included preclusion of a species' recovery.
Consequently, Patila ii did not support the Navy's contention that only degradation inducing extinction defines harm. Reply Brief for Appellant at 23, Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d at 1410 (9th Cir.
1990).
21. Brief for Appellee, supranote 4, at 28.
22. Id. Specifically, the Navy argued that "[tlhe obvious additional problem with the Tribe's
'taking' theory is that it cannot distinguish among users of Truckee River water." Id. At trial, on
the other hand, FWS biologists presented the following deductions: 1) The Navy's current diversions
harm the cui-ui and adversely impact on its survival. 2) Reducing water to the Navy's out-lease
program would significantly benefit the cui-i, after the initial year. Brief for Appellant, supra note
14, at 25-26.
23. Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
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.actually caused the cui-ui's spawning problems." '2 Thus, the court
dismissed the Tribe's claim of harm.
*

.

Analysis of the Holding
Analysis of the court's ruling reveals that, in truth, the Ninth Circuit
never reached the issue of whether the Navy harmed the cui-ui, because
of the Tribe's inability to prove that only the Navy degraded the cui-ui's
habitat. On its face, the opinion appeared to apply a Pallia 11 definition
of harm-"habitat degradation that could result in extinction"--or, in
the alternative, a nebulous "actual causer" definition. But, the court
could not have used either definition. The court concluded that the cuiui did not suffer harm, based on its decision that the evidence failed to
prove the diversions actually caused its spawning problems. 2
Based on the facts of the case, the court's holding is incongruent with
application of either definition. Testimony at trial established that the
diversions harmed and adversely affected the cui-ui's survival. Such testimony verified the Navy as an actualcauser of cui-ui habitatdegradation
that could result in extinction. Thus, from these facts, the conclusion that
the diversion did not harm the cui-ui is incompatible with either: 1) a
definition of harm as habitat degradation that could result in extinction
or, 2) a definition of harm, which is "actually caused" habitat degradation.
The court's ruling and its recitation of the Palila 11 standard, therefore,
shed no light on what influenced the court's conclusion.
On the other hand, another statement illumines the court's basis for
its finding of no harm. Immediately after its holding statement, the court
remarked that "the Tribe fail[ed] to distinguish the Navy from the other
users of Truckee River water." 2' It appears the court determined that the
Tribe must first prove the Navy was the one and only actual causer. If
so, then the court's holding is compatible with the facts because the Navy
was not the only entity diverting Truckee water. According to the court's
opinion, the Tribe must prove that the Navy was the sole actual causer
before a claim of harm in section 9 would be evaluated. Since the Tribe
failed to prove that the Navy was the only actual causer, the court never
decided whether the Navy's diversions harmed the cui-ui.
Overview of ESA Section 9 Cases
The Ninth Circuit's ruling takes on greater import after reviewing
earlier cases involving section 9 claims. In the years immediately fol24. Id. (emphasis added). The District Court did not address the issue of whether the Navy's
out-lease program harmed the cui-ui. The Ninth Circuit determined that the record was complete
enough for it to address that issue for the first time on appeal. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
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lowing passage of the ESA in 1973, section 9 was "a simple but littlenoticed provision in that Act." 2" Originally, the federal government used
section 9 primarily as a means to curtail hunting or collecting of endangered species. 29 For example, the court upheld seizure of a cream, derived
from the endangered sperm whale, in Delbay Pharmaceuticalsv. Department of Commerce."
In contrast, use of section 9 as a means to protect the habitats of
endangered species proved ineffectual. As an illustration, in SierraClub
v. Froehlke,3' the Sierra Club unsuccessfully tried to stop construction
of the Meramec Park Lake Dam in Missouri. Creation of the dam would
result in the flooding of caves that were home to the endangered Indiana
bat. The Sierra Club alleged that the construction violated section 9
because destruction of its habitat harmed the bat. The court refused to
interpret flooding the caves as harming the bat and thus approved construction of. the dam. Next, in 1977, the federal appeals court in Hill v.
Tennessee Valley Authority32 declined to reach the section 9 issue. Three
years later, in North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 3 a district court dismissed
a section 9 claim that federal agency action would result in a taking at
some time in the future.
28. Thornton, Takings under Endangered SpeciesAct Section 9, 4 Nat. Res. & Env't. 7. 7 (1990).
"Section 9 was initially not recognized as a potent element of the ESA. Potentially, however, Section
9 is only limited by the definition of 'take."' Comment, The Whooping Crane, The Platte River,
and EndangeredSpecies Legislation, 66 Neb. L. Rev. 175, 192 (1987).
29. Note, Paula v. Dep't of Land & Natural Resources: "Taking" Under Section 9 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 4 U. Haw. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1982).
30. 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1976). Because section 9 prohibited interstate shipment of illegally
taken endangered wildlife, the court upheld seizure of the Lotrimin. An economic hardship exemption, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1969, gave Delbay's predecessor in interest the
right to import and sell spermaceti in interstate commerce. Delbay contended that the ESA of 1973
was enacted after his spermaceti was legally in the country. Thus, the 1973 act had no effect on the
subsequent use of the legally imported spermaceti. The court reasoned that even if the regulation
permitted the plaintiff's spermaceti, some persons illegally imported spermaceti. To allow any
spermaceti to enter interstate commerce increased enforcement difficulties. Id.
31. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). The Indiana Bat was found primarily in Missouri, Kentucky,
and Tennessee. The entire population numbered 700,000 of which 10,000 to 15,000 would be
affected by the reservoir. At trial, an expert testified that the project would jeopardize the continued
existence of the bat. ld. at 1303.
32. The court considered section 9 insignificant since it briefly dealt with this issue in two
footnotes. For example, footnote 14 reads as follows: "In light of this conclusion [that 'closure of
the Tellico Dam & consequent creation of the Tellico reservoir will jeopardize the continued existence

of the snail darter or destroy or modify the critical habitat thereof'] we do not deem it necessary to
." 549 F.2d
decide whether defendant's activities constitute an illegal 'taking' of the species ..
1064, 1069-70 nn. 13-14,
33. Environmental organizations and native Alaskans brought action to enjoin the Secretary of
the Interior from carrying out a lease sale of federal properties with oil and gas potentials off the
northern coast of Alaska in the Beaufort Sea. It was alleged that the lease sale would lead to the
eventual degradation of the critical habitat of the Bowhead whale and endanger the whale's existence.
Plaintiffs presented evidence that exploitation and production of oil and gas in the Beaufort Sea
could create a definite threat to the Bowhead's continued survival. However, they were unable to
prove that the lease sale itself was a threat to the Bowhead's existence. 486 F. Supp. 332, 360-62
(D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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In 1981, Pallia v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources
(PaulaI)' dramatically changed the interpretation of section 9 by including environmental modifications, which adversely affect an entire
endangered species, as a taking. Prior to this case, only action that directly
killed a member of a listed species qualified as a taking prohibited by
section 9.35 Patla I also became the first case to invalidate an action
based solely on section 9.3
In Palla 1,environmentalists sought to force the Hawaii Department
of Land & Natural Resources to remove permanently all feral sheep and
goats from the critical habitat of the Palila. 3 The Palila, an endangered
species, is solely indigenous to Hawaii.' The bird evolved in the ecosystem of the mamane and naio forests of Mauna Kea, and so uniquely
adapted to those forests that it could not survive anywhere else. 9 The
feral sheep and goats decimated the mamane and naio forests by browsing.'
Consequently, the Palila population declined. The court found that Hawaii's sheep and goat management program contributed to environmental
modification or degradation of the Palila's habitat. This degradation, in
turn, injured or killed the bird and was thus an illegal taking. 4 ' The
environmentalists won their injunction; on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.4'
Palilal's expansion of section 9 case law to include habitat modification
gained national recognition, though adoption of this expansion was not
uniform among courts. Courts in California43 and Florida cited and fol34. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
35. Note, Palla v. Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, supra note 29, at 181.
36. Comment, Paula v. Hawaii: State Governments Fall Prey to the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 10 Ecology L. Q. 281-82 (1982).
37. "A 'feral' animal is one that was once domesticated or is descended from domesticated
animals, but is now living as a wild creature." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources
(Palila II), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1071 n.1 (D. Hawaii 1988), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. The Palla is a member of the Hawaiian Honeycreeper family. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land
& Natural Resources (Palila I), 471 F. Supp. at 988.
39. The shape of the Palila's bill allows it to feed easily on the seed pods of the mamane. This
feature, however, makes it almost impossible for the Palila to adapt to a different food source.
Comment, supra note 36, at 283. "The Palila's only food is the hard, bean-like seed of the mamane,
a small tree commonly found in high areas on the island of Hawaii. The Palila evolved a thick beak,
unique among the Honeycreepers, to crack these seeds." Note, Paula v. Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources, supra note 29, at 184 n. 16.
40. Pa/ila 1. 471 F. Supp. at 989-90. "Before the arrival of Europeans in Hawaii in the late
1700s, no grazing mammals existed in the islands. Native trees such as the mamane evolved without
thorns or unpalatable leaves, features which would have protected them from such grazing animals.
As a result, they proved extremely vulnerable to grazing after the introduction of sheep .... Note,
Palia v. Dep't of Land & NaturalResources, supra note 29, at 184, n.16.
41. Palta1, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Hawaii 1979), afd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. Palia!, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
43. Cf. Ca. ex. re. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1387 (C.D. Cal. 1981), af'd in part,
rev'd in part, vacated in part, stayed in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds,
464 U.S. 312 (1984) (However, the court found no taking since only a threat of harm occurred).
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lowed the Ninth Circuit in ruling that habitat degradation was a taking.
For instance, in Fundfor Animals v. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish
Commission," high water had trapped a deer herd in a small area of the
Florida Everglades. To prevent starvation of the entire herd, a wildlife
commission proposed a hunt to eliminate some of the deer.' Environmental groups alleged that use of airboats would disrupt behavior patterns

of endangered species in the area.' The court cited Palila I, but reasonably
concluded that use of the vehicles for only four days would not significantly modify or degrade the species' habitat.47
On the other hand, not all courts extended a section 9 taking to include
habitat modification. As an illustration, plaintiffs tried to block construction of an oil pipeline from Washington to Minnesota in No Oilport! v.
Carter." Laying of the pipeline across Puget Sound allegedly was a taking
of endangered species in the area. The court, ceremoniously, stated that
a taking included environmental modification or degradation of habitat
which actually injures or kills wildlife.49 But, then it refused to acknowledge that highly disruptive activity, necessary to construct the pipeline,
might alter any endangered species' habitat to such an extent as to qualify
as a taking."
The Fish and Wildlife Service reacted to PalilaI by authorizing a new
definition of harm." The Acting Secretary for the FWS explained that
Paila I could "incorrectly imply that under the ... [old] definition of
'harm,' a taking may occur from habitat modification alone. "52 The FWS
thus redefined harm to its present form in an attempt to condemn habitat
44. 550 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
45. Id.
46. The Florida panther, Everglades kite, and Indigo snake exist in the area where the deer were
trapped. Id. at 1210.
47. Id.
48. No Oiiport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 342 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
49. Id. at 365.
50. Id.
51. When Congress enacted the ESA it did not define harm. Instead, Congress left it to the FWS
to define harm in its regulations that implement the ESA.
The previous regulatory definition of harm, in effect during Palila I.stated that: 'Harm' in the
definition of 'take' in the Act means an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife,
including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns,
which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering: significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of 'harm."' D.
Rohlf, Endangered Species Act Handbook 63, n.19 (1989). For the present definition of harm, see
note 13 and accompanying text.
The Acting Secretary originaly proposed a definition of "harm" that read: "an act which actually
injures or kills wildlife." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palla I1), 649 F.
Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Hawaii 1988), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). Actual death or injury
to individual species would be required under this definition. Of 328 comments the Acting Secretary
received on the proposed new definition, 262 were in opposition. The Secretary "thus did not adopt
the original proposal, but promulgated the version that exists today." Id. at 1076-77.
52. Id. at 1076.
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modification under section 9 only if modification actually killed or injured
wildlife.53
The goal of the second Palila suit was removal of all mouflon sheep
from the Palila's habitat.' Defendants claimed that the new definition of
harm mandated a result different from Palila1. They introduced census
data which proved that the number of Palila had remained constant or
even increased slightly since Palila I. No individual thus actually died
as a result of the mouflon's presence. Also, the defendants' expert testified

that the mouflon ate primarily shoots and sprouts of the mamane, whereas
the Palila ate primarily the seeds and pods. No rivalry for food ensued
between the animals, so no taking occurred. He conceded that the mouflon
degraded the forests, but argued that this destruction amounted 55to only
"potential" injury, which was not within the definition of harm.
The court rejected these claims as "a shortsighted and limited interpretation of 'harm.' " The court emphasized that the new definition
stressed a link between habitat modification and injury by eliminating
habitat modification from "harm" unless death or injury befell protected
wildlife. But, evidence of death or injury to a member of an endangered
species was unnecessary because harm applied to a species as a whole."
Nor did harm require proof that habitat degradation presently drove a
species to extinction. Rather, habitatdestruction that prevents recovery,'
by affecting essential behavior patterns, denotes actual injury." Thus,
harm does not require a decline in population.
Applying this reasoning, the court held that the mouflon's browsing
irreversibly damaged the mamane forest by preventing its regeneration.
Degradation by the mouflon stymied the Palila's recovery and survival
by suppressing available and future food supply and nesting sites. The
mouflon thus harmed the species as a whole in spite of statistics showing
no present decline in Palila. 9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling that
harm included extinction caused by habitat destruction, concluding that
this interpretation fell within the new definition of harm.' Without com53. Whether the new definition really changed the first definition of "harm" became a major
issue in Palila !!. D. Rohlf, supra note 51, at 63-64.
54. The moufion sheep were not included in PatilaI because study of the mouflon had not been
completed. Palilafl, 649 F. Supp. at 1071. The mouflon sheep originally came from Corsica and
Sardinia. The mouflon were brought to "Mauna Kea with the original hope that they would upgrade
the existing feral sheep and modify some of their undesirable characteristics." Id. at 1074. The
mouflon were maintained for "sport-hunting purposes within the Mauna Kea Game Management

Area." Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1080.
Palita v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila I), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th

Cir. 1988).
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ment, the Ninth Circuit qualified its affirmation by not reaching the issue
of "whether. . . harm [also] included habitat degradation that precludes
recovery of an endangered species." 6'
Commentators hailed PalilaII for providing a powerful tool for habitat
preservation and endangered species protection.62 Case law also indicated
judicial confidence in the perimeters of harm as set forth in PalilaII. For
instance, in SierraClub v. Lyng,6 a the court commended and twice cited
Judge King's analysis in Palla II relating to the definition of harm. 6 The
Lyng court ruled that timber management activities resulting in adverse
habitat modification harmed the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.'s
The court pronounced that the Forest Service's action did not merely
impair recovery.' Rather, the service's methods produced a decline in
the number of woodpeckers. 67 But, the court stated that harm does not
require proof of death of individual members of a species.'
Also, the court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, Environmental ProtectionAgency,' cited Palila II as expansively construing a
taking. Plaintiffs, in that case, alleged an illegal taking as a consequence
of the EPA's approval of strychnine for certain above-ground uses."
Following the lead in Palila 11, the court adopted an exceptionally broad
61. Id. at
O110-l
(emphasis added).
62. "[S]ection 9 now has emerged as a major force for wildlife conservation." Thorton, supra
note 28, at 7-8. Accord Note, Palila v. Dep't of Land & NaturalResources, supra note 29, at 193.
63. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), afd in part, rev'd in part, Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Forest
Service's even-aged management practices violated the ESA.).
64. Id. at 1271 n.8.
65. The red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoldesborealis) is a small bird found in pine forests of
southern states. "The woodpecker prefers to nest in old growth pine trees, where it forages on insects
and occasionally on small fruits and seeds.... The last remaining populations of these birds are
concentrated in the national forests, primarily because the old growth pines on private land have
largely been eliminated." Id. at 1265.
66. The Davy Crockett National Forest went from 46 colonies of red-cockaded woodpeckers in
1983 to 27 in 1987 (a 41% depopulation). The Angelina National Forest went from 38 colonies in
1983 to 22 in 1987 (a 42% depopulation). The Sabine National Forest went from 25 colonies in
1978 to 7 in 1987 (a 76% depopulation). Id. at 1271.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1270. Conclusion of the suit permanently enjoined the Forest Service from harvesting
timber in that area since the Forest Service failed to convert from even-aged to uneven-aged management techniques which would preserve "old growth" pines within 1,200 meters of any redcockaded woodpecker colony site. Id. at 1278.
69. 688 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.
1989) (The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the EPA's strychnine registrations
constituted takings under the ESA.).
70. The EPA registered pesticides and rodenticides containing strychnine to control rodents,
lagomorphs (rabbits, hares and pikas) and birds. (Up to one-half million pounds of strychnine bait
is used annually for rodent control.) The EPA required that baits be placed in a manner in which
targeted species alone were likely to ingest the poison. However, there can also be "secondary"
poisoning, as when a carnivore ingests a bird which has ingested strychnine. In this case, there was
evidence of "secondary" strychnine poisoning of endangered species. Id. at 1338-39.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL[.

[Vol. 31

definition of taking and barred the EPA from further registration of strychnine pesticides." PaliaII, therefore, served as a model for interpreting
harm to preserve endangered species and their habitats, as these cases
illustrate.
Implications of the 9th Circuit's Holding
The Ninth Circuit, in Tribe v. Navy, lost a critical opportunity to resolve
issues fundamental to the application of section 9 of the ESA by avoiding
the issue of multiple habitat degraders and by misstating in Tribe v. Navy
its holding in Palilla II.
The Holding Relieved Multiple Contributors to a Single Habitat's
Degradation from Responsibility.
The court never reached the issue of whether the Navy harmed the cuiui because of the Tribe's inability to prove that the Navy solely degraded
the cui-ui's habitat. If it must be proved that one of several contributors
to a habitat's degradation is the "actual causer," then all contributors
will be immune from liability. For example, to establish that the Navy
was the only actual causer was impossible since others also used Truckee
water. If the Tribe next sued the city of Reno, based on section 9, the
same reasoning would relieve Reno of liability. Inability to prove that
one entity solely caused a habitat's destruction, since multiple entities
contributed to the degradation, results in no one being held responsible
for the harm.

Apportionment of Responsibility Among All Contributors Would
Better Conserve Endangered Species
Preservation of endangered species requires application of an equitable
policy to allocate responsibility among contributors, rather than exempting multiple habitat degraders. The Navy understandably emphasized the
inequity of holding it solely responsible for the degradation of the cuiui's habitat. Yet, limiting responsibility simply because many contribute
to the degradation eliminates all Truckee water users from liability. So,
potent utilization of section 9 for habitat conservation required the court
to employ a strategy for resolving the issue of habitat degradation by
multiple contributors.
Other areas of the law offer alternatives for assigning liability when
more than one actor simultaneously causes injury. As an illustration, in
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,7" the New Mexico Court
of Appeals abolished joint and several liability under which the "concurrent negligence of numerous tortfeasors combine[d] to cause a single
71. Id. at 1354-55.
72. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 649 P.2d 794 (1982).
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indivisible injury, [and] each defendant [was] fully (jointly and severally)
liable for the entire injury."73 Application of joint and several liability
potentially resulted in only one tortfeasor being totally and individually
liable for the tort of several. Recognizing the inequity, the Bartlett court
"imposed several liability on tortfeasors by extending the application of
comparative fault apportionment from plaintiff/defendant comparisons to
comparisons of the tortious conduct of all persons--plaintiffs, defendants
and even non-party wrongdoers." '74
The concept of comparative fault apportionment in tort litigation can
be applied to multiple habitat degraders. In Tribe v. Navy, for instance,
evidence established that diversions of Truckee water harmed the cui-ui.
The percentage of liability for each entity diverting Truckee water could
be established by measuring the number of acre-feet diverted by each
user. Comparative fault apportionment thus offers one alternative to resolve the situation of habitat degradation by multiple contributors. An
alternative, therefore, existed which the Ninth Circuit might have adopted
to fairly apportion fault among all Truckee water users whose diversions
contributed to the degradation of the cui-ui's habitat." Apportionment of
fault would have effected a better result by carrying out congressional
intent of conserving endangered species, while at the same time assuring
that no one water user bare the entire burden of that task.
The Opinion Rendered the Definition of Harm Ineffectual and Left
Unsettled Whether Harm Would be Broadly or Narrowly
Construed
In Tribe v. Navy, the Ninth Circuit misquoted its own holding in Palila
II, which left unclear the meaning of harm and how narrowly or broadly
the court will interpret section 9 in future cases. Though the court changed
only one word, that deviation significantly clouded the meaning of harm.
The deviation also profoundly altered the proposition established by Paila
II that the Ninth Circuit endorsed an expansive definition of harm, which
included acts that degrade a species' habitat and thereby preclude its
recovery.76
73. Occhialino, TheImpact offtn-MuualCollateralEstoppelon Tort Litigation Involving Several
Liability 18 N.M.L. Rev. 559, 561 (1988).
74. Id.
75. In lieu of litigation, the Tribe also had at least one other option. Negotiation is increasingly
being used for resolving controversies relating to American Indian water rights and resource management. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes Involving
Indian Rights, 28 Nat. Res. J. 63 (1988).
76. The Ninth Circuit's failure to overrule the district court led commentators and other courts
to conclude that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that harm included preclusion
of a species' recovery. The following statement illustrates this proposition: "Paula11's emphasis on
how an activity affects species recovery as the standard to determine whether a taking has occurred
breaks new legal ground with respect to section 9." D. Rohlf; supra note 51, at 65 (emphasis
added). See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1270 (E.D. Tex. 1988) aff'd in part, rev'd in
part. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversed on other grounds).
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In Palla
iI, the court appeared to use a broad definition of harm, by
stating that habitat destruction resulting in extinction was within the definition of harm. This statement implied that habitat destruction resulting
in extinction was not the only definition of harm." However, in Tribe v.
Navy, the court appeared to use a narrow definition of harm by stating
that harm constitutes habitat destruction resulting in'extinction. This statement implied that harm included habitat destruction only if extinction
resulted. Thus, by substituting within in PailaiI to constitutes in Tribe
v. Navy, the court changed its position in Palila I to imply that harm
means only habitat destruction leading to extinction.
By misquoting its holding, the court left the meaning of harm in the
ESA evasive and ineffectual. Additionally, through its misstatement, the
court reversed its broad interpretation of section 9 in Palilla11 by applying
a narrow interpretation in Tribe v. Navy. As a result of the court's wavering
from one interpretation to another, there is uncertainty as to which way
it will lean in the future.
The Clear Meaning, Related Provisions, and Legislative Intent of
the ESA Do Not Support a Restrictive Interpretation of Harm
In view of the Ninth Circuit's ostensible shift to a restrictive construction of harm, it becomes relevant to consider the merit of that position.
Arguments exist in favor of both an expansive and a restrictive construction. For example, an expansive view of what constitutes harm, in the
context of a section 9 taking, finds support from several sources. First,
the ESA itself directly supports a broad view of harm. The intent of
Congress in enacting the ESA is explicit:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved.7
Hence, the evident purpose of the ESA is to protect endangered species
and their habitats.' 0 This two-fold purpose confirms that habitat degradation or modification which harms protected species is a taking within
the clear meaning of the Act. 8
Additionally, by enacting the ESA, Congress advanced its goal of
77. Paila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Paila II), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th
Cir. 1988).

78. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420
(9th Cir. 1990).

79. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
80. See also Liner, Environmental Law--the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978:
Congress Responds to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 1327, 1330 (1979).
81. Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking Conceptfrom its Beginning to its Culminationin
the EndangeredSpecies Act, 21 Hous. L. Rev. 457, 486 (1984).
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conserving endangered species. To allow habitat destruction which prevents recovery but stops short of extinction would hinder conservation.82
This deduction, likewise, favors a definition of harm that includes habitat
degradation that precludes recovery since Congress intended for endangered species to recover. Accordingly, the ESA suggests an expansive
construction of harm.
Second, the ESA's legislative history indicates the goal of a broad
scheme for protecting endangered species. The Ninth Circuit itself in
Palila 11 remarked that interpretation of harm must mirror congressional
policy. The court then quoted a Senate Report on the ESA as follows:
"'Take' is defined in ... the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way in which a person can 'take."' 83 This corroborates that
a taking should include any habitat degradation that precludes recovery.
Legislative history thus directly supports a broad construction of the term
harm.
Lastly, related provisions of the ESA are consistent with an expansive
view of harm. An ESA amendment created exceptions to section 9's
taking prohibition through permits authorizing "incidental takings" of
endangered species." Such permits are allowed, however, only if the
incidental taking "will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species." 5 Since Congress prohibited an incidental taking if it significantly reduced a species' recovery, it follows
that Congress likewise intended to prohibit habitat degradation which
retards recovery.
There are also arguments that favor a restrictive construction of harm.
For instance, some insist that a broad interpretation, which prohibits acts
not allowing recovery, renders section 7's jeopardy standard pointless.'
But, section 7 affects only federal agency action, whereas section 9's
82. See Note, HabitatConservation Plans Under The Endangered Species Act, 24 San Diego L.
Rev. 243, 254 (1987). ("Emphasizing survival over recovery runs counter to the ESA's purposes

of conservation and of bringing about recovery.")
83. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palla 11), 852 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th

Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
84. "To obtain a permit for an incidental taking' the applicant must submit a Habitat Conservation
Plan outlining the likely impact of the taking." Note, Habitat ConservationPlans, supra note 82,
at 260 (This note explains and evaluates section 10 (a) of the ESA under which incidental takings
are permitted). See generally Note, Where Have All the Butterflies Gone? Ninth Circuit Upholds
Decision to Allow Incidental Taking, 16 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 93 (1986) (This note discusses
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985). In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held that a FWS permit allowing the incidental taking of certain endangered butterflies
from the San Bruno Mountain in California did not violate the ESA.); Comment, Conflicting Values:
The Religious Killing of Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 Nat. Res. J. 709, 723-24 (1990). (This
article includes a short passage regarding other ESA exemptions. For example, there is only one
Indian exemption and it is only applicable in Alaska.)
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(BXiv) (988) (emphasis added).
86. Dezendorf, PaUla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources: A New Interpretation of
"Taking" Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 19 Idaho L. Rev. 157, 170-71 (1983).
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taking prohibition applies to all persons. A broad construction of harm
merely results in the provisions overlapping. 7
Another concern with an expansive interpretation of harm embraces
its impact on private land use. Activities on non-federal land that adversely
impact recovery of endangered species would become illegal under a
broad interpretation of harm. The ESA's legislative history, however,
does not indicate intent to create sweeping controls on non-federal land
use." Notwithstanding, Congress created exceptions for incidental takings
as noted above.
Finally, opponents claim that an expansive definition of harm poses
problems when several separate entities effect a taking. In fact, the two
issues are independent and do not affect each other. If multiple entities
are exempt from liability for a taking, as in Tribe v. Navy, then the
definition of harm is irrelevant. Since it cannot be proven that any one
is an actual causer, then no contributor will be liable regardless of how
broadly harm is construed. If, however, fault is apportioned among all
contributors, then the same standard applies to each. Therefore, a broad
definition of harm creates no more problems when numerous unconnected
entities effect a taking.
The issue of an expansive versus a restrictive interpretation of harm
raises considerable debate. The impact of a broad interpretation on private
land use poses significant problems. But the problems can be mitigated
by using existing exemptions and advocating for additional exemptions.
A broad construction of section 9, on the other hand, harmonizes with
the clear meaning, related provisions, and legislative intent of the ESA.
Therefore, despite the Ninth Circuit's vacillating from a broad to a narrow
interpretation of harm, the more persuasive arguments favor an expansive
construction.
CONCLUSION
In view of its previous role as a forerunner in endangered species
protection, the Ninth Circuit's section 9 holding in Tribe v. Navy is
disappointing and perplexing. In the early years of the ESA, section 9,
which prohibits taking endangered species, offered little protection. Then,
through the Palila cases, the Ninth Circuit became a national leader in
87. Id. at 171 (Section 7 and section 9 "can coexist and provide diverse methods for achieving
the same goal: protection of endangered species' critical habitat.").
88. D. Rohlf, supra note 51, at 66-67. See also Tarlock, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Western
Water Rights, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 18-19 (1985). (Congress was aware of the Western States'
concerns that state-created water rights might be displaced by environmental regulations); Rolston
11, PropertyRights and EndangeredSpecies, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 283 (1990) (The ESA prohibits
"taking" endangered species of both animals and plants. A double question arises when endangered
species are on private property: "Do endangered species prohibitions against taking animals and
plants on private land also involve a taking of property that requires just compensation?").
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upholding an expansive view of section 9. As a result, section 9 emerged
as a potentially forceful instrument for habitat conservation and endangered species protection.
For example, the court upheld environmental modifications which adversely affected an entire species as a taking. Previously, only acts that
directly killed a member of a listed species were deemed as takings. It
also appeared for awhile that habitat destruction that prevented recovery
of a species, by affecting essential behavior patterns, would be upheld
as a taking. The Ninth Circuit's progressive stand in favor of a broad
construction of section 9 influenced courts throughout the United States.
Tribe v. Navy provided a means for the Ninth Circuit to continue to
delineate the contours of section 9. The opinion, however, raises more
questions than it answers. For instance, the court purported to, but in
truth did not, evaluate whether the Navy's diversions effected a taking
since they harmed the cui-ui and jeopardized its survival. A closer reading
reveals that the court never reached the issue of harm since the Tribe
failed to prove that the Navy alone actually caused degradation of the
cui-ui's habitat. According to the holding, only if the Tribe first proved
that the Navy was the only actual causer would a claim of harm in section
9 be evaluated. If multiple contributors degrade a single habitat, then it
can never be proved that any one actually caused the destruction and all
are exempt from blame. Degradation of the habitat remains unchecked,
further imperiling the endangered species. Consequently, even when habitat destruction obliterates an entire species, no contributors will be accountable.
Congress' intent in passing the ESA was to conserve endangered species and their habitats. Application of section 9 for that purpose required
the Ninth Circuit to adopt a policy for resolving the issue of a single

habitat's degradation by multiple entities. One alternative, comparative
fault apportionment in tort litigation, is applicable to environmental issues
such as section 9. An option thus existed whereby the court could have
fairly distributed responsibility among all Truckee water users whose
diversions degraded the cui-ui's habitat. Therefore, instead of exempting
the Navy as one of several degraders, application of section 9 required
the court to employ an equitable policy for spreading responsibility among
all degraders.
The opinion also rendered the definition for harm in section 9 vague
and ineffectual. The court misquoted its own holding in Palla II to imply
that harm included only habitat destruction that results in extinction. Its
holding in Pallia II, however, suggested that habitat destruction resulting
in extinction was not the only possible definition of harm. By changing
the exact wording used in Palila II, the court effected a different intimation. This deviation caused confusion regarding the meaning of harm
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in section 9. Also, by misquoting Palila 11, the court left indefinite the
proposition established in Palila H, that the Ninth Circuit supported an
expansive view of harm. In Tribe v. Navy, the court took a restrictive
view of harm, though the more persuasive arguments favor an expansive
interpretation.
The Tribe v. Navy opinion raised several doubts regarding interpretation
of section 9 of the ESA. The decision leaves uncertain how section 9
should be applied when there are several contributors to a single habitat's
degradation. It is vague from the decision what constitutes harm within
section 9. It is unclear whether a restrictive or expansive construction of
harm will be favored by the Ninth Circuit. Consequently, the survival of
untold numbers of endangered species may be further jeopardized. Their
advocates will have no idea from the opinion how to proceed in order to
establish an ESA taking. The Ninth Circuit failed to clarify important
terms and issues in section 9 that would protect endangered species and
their habitats.
JUDITH LUCK

